Harvard Law School Forum: Allen Dulles Speech

 

-topic: role of intelligence in policymaking

-served with OSS during WWII; then Deputy Director of CIA 51-53; DCI 1953-61

-around WWI-glorification of espionage as romantic, adventurous

-what is gathered as intelligence; how is it evaluated and applied in policy?

            -can services acquire too much power over policy?

            -what is the relationship between intelligence and policy?

-born 1893; educated at Princeton and GWU; US diplomat from 22-26; delegate to Geneva Conferences; lawyer with Sullivan and Cromwell; then OSS, CIA jobs

            -honorary degrees from several Ivy League universities

-Dulles: job of intelligence to submit info but not to make policy

-appointed to the Warren Commission; refers to multiple Presidential assassinations

-currently the start of the panel’s work; waiting while Ruby case is pending

-admits certain types of intel work are “not tainted by any legality”, international or domestic

-notes that world is almost 1/3 communist; it does not respect principles of law, requiring US to have intel service (especially in regard to threat of Soviet attack)

-says he even worked in intel as early as WWI

-March 1917-in Vienna for diplomatic service; transferred to Born, Switzerland

            -met someone who was traveling to meet Lenin in Zurich (but Dulles did not)

            -worked as intel officer in WWI; covered Austro-Hungarian Empire; also

participated in Versailles Peace Conference; as well as the negotiations leading to armistice

-notes that that was before the days of mass media

-war ended when German armies were still intact

-considers Wilson’s policy wiser than “unconditional surrender” of WWII

-influenced by highly false theory of WWI-that Germans hadn’t been dealt with

stringently at Versailles (but they did get it wrong in Versailles)

-days leading up to WWII-cites several main intelligence failures of the West

            -1) did not understand implications of Communist menace

                        -we didn’t feel we had time for it; thus we didn’t take it seriously

            -2) error with dealing w/Hitler’s power and intention

            -3) ditto with Japan

            All of these were intelligence failures that could have mitigated (but we only had

military intelligence at the time; this was before the OSS/CIA)

-cites Pearl Harbor as outstanding example of the failure to use (not collect) intelligence; as we were reading many of Japanese codes, receiving information about Japanese policy

-does not claim that anyone could have precisely pointed to future attack (but we should have realized that great crisis was on the way with Japanese relations

-calls “bunk” that there was treachery in Pearl Harbor or that we “invited” the attack

-after war; intel services had been built up, strengthened (OSS had been developed)

-but most of it was disbanded postwar under the impression that the Soviets wanted to make a peace; thus we didn’t really need intelligence service

-1945-7: disbanding of intelligence

-feels Russians were going to get into the far eastern war no matter what

-1947: awakening began under Truman; CIA set up

            -Truman doctrine: US (used in Greece, Turkey) pledged self to come to aid of any

Nation resisting Communist infiltration

-based on theory that countries would invite us in (as in Greece and Turkey)-turned back possibly imminent Communist takeover

-National Security Act; created CIA; Air Force; recombined military divisions

            -all done under reaction to Soviet deception; it had used its spheres of influence

            As means of communizing eastern European countries

            -Chinese takeover by Communism was underway

            -Czechoslovakia, w/o Soviet troops, was taken over by ruthless Communist

minority subversion (same general pattern of minority rule as in 1917 Russian Revolution)

-says no case where Communism was freely voted in (with one possible exception)

-CIA created as a tool to fight Communism worldwide; its expansion

            -other functions: coordinated intel work in gov; collect secret intel (espionage);

            In addition to overt intel collected by military, state dept., etc.

            -secret intel was only one of branches

            -counterintel worldwide (FBI domestically) to penetrate other intelligence

Agencies

            -very efficient system-has caught many Soviet agency

-function: prepare national estimates; collation of all intelligence from all

Departments of government (as represented in National Intelligence Board)-produced so as to provide policymakers with accurate, coherent information

-CIA has no business to suggest what policies should be, but rather give its

appraisal of facts to be used by President, Cabinet, etc.

-keeps mentioning subversive threat of international communism

-work to coordinate all especially important areas to National Security (each task assigned to best intel branch, whether an armed forces one, state, etc.)

-no espionage operation is tainted with legality

-cites comparable example of Soviets sending man over compared to US U2 overflights over Russia

-hard for him to see how U2 is more a violation of law than agents

-important Cold War functions

-CIA has role because much of Communist subversive work against free countries that are least able to govern selves with weakest economies; covert operation

-their advantage in this sense: worldwide communist parties (once hidden under veil of Comintern, but no longer)

-claims most communist parties of world are directed from Communist central

Committee in Moscow

-such parties are an important subversive weapon (US has no such comparable tool)

-often parties receive little voter support

-Soviets tries to use Wests’ free institutions against us and then ban democracy and vote

-also Communist-dominated labor unions; have to be penetrated by intel work

-no secret of how FBI has penetrated US Communist party; CIA’s penetration of

Foreign communist parties is secret, very important work

-a lot of popular fronts cultivated like peace, youth, labor groups (war against progressives)-Soviet intel agencies fund them under Kruschev’s leadership

            -essential that we have secret services to penetrate the communist underground;

            Cannot be publicly revealed, but gives policymakers idea of the subversive threat

            In various nations

            -says Kruschev cites “wars of independence” that will be funded by Soviets as

means of covert Communist takeover

-attacks against CIA

            -greatest one comes from the Soviets

            -more worrying domestic attacks be journalists; who say intel service is not in

American tradition

-claims George Washington spent great energy on intel (but critics say that intel is only appropriate in time of peace)

            -says intel services can’t be turned on and off; plus, we are not now in a

            Time of peace but of Cold War

-claims that CIA makes policy: Dulles responds that all CIA operations have been

approved by policymakers

-cites 2 embarrassments (Bay of Pigs and U2)-Dulles asked President to assume

responsibility for them

-uproar in press over CIA actions in Vietnam; Dulles said that CIA decided it was

Important that Vietnamese police should be given aid to stop the Viet Cong/Communist infiltration; aid resulted in very efficient instrument, but leaders of Vietnam turned these instruments against their own internal dissidents

-similarly in Cuba-US aided anti-communist fight, but Batista turned these US trained goons against internal enemies

-raises question of whether these should have been done (but the aid campaigns had been approved

-notes that many journalists are recommending watchdog committee

            -cites that last 2 presidents have appointed such committees to report on intel

            Services to themselves

-notes that CIA reports to 4 committees in Congress, who study its budget

            -notes that budget is secret, but is definitely not at $1 billion

-feels that CIA is stellar group of men and women who deserve American support, as does the entire project

            -there are some shortcomings

 

 

 

 

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