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Working papers CEO Social Status and Risk Taking (Job Market Paper) I find that executive officers' social status concerns affect their risk taking. I use prestigious business awards assigned by editorials of major national publications (such as Business Week) to measure shocks to CEO status. My hypothesis is that awards represent a tournament-like payoff that is denominated in terms of social status. I find that firms with award-winning CEOs invest less in R&D and more in tangible assets relative to a matched sample of non-winning CEOs. In line with the theoretical predictions of a risk-taking tournament, I find that firms with winning CEOs monotonically decrease their idiosyncratic volatility ratios and their industry betas converge to 1. I interpret the results as evidence for the significance of social status concerns in managerial risk taking.
The Weekend Effect in Equity Option Returns (with Christopher Jones)
Revise-and-resubmit, Journal of Finance
Work in progress Thou Shalt not Covet Thy (suburban) Neighbor's Car (with Fernando Zapatero) This paper studies the effect of population density on the intensity of "keeping up with the Joneses" behavior. Using a unique dataset of car registrations from 2004 to 2006 in three counties of Southern California, we show that neighbor effects are stronger in areas with lower population density. The decision to buy a car is strongly influenced by previous car purchases of neighbors, and the effect is substantially stronger in areas with lower population density. Such areas represent small communities in which neighbors are likely to know each other, and can therefore manifest their income or wealth through the public display of their consumption. The evidence is consistent with two possible channels of influence: information and status concerns. We find evidence supporting both channels, as our results cannot be fully explained by information exchange, or word of mouth. We argue that the stronger effect that we find in areas with lower population density is driven by status signaling reasons. |
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