

Interrogatives

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1 Operational Language

1.1 2 Assumptions

(1) Wittgenstein (1918):

1. The world is all that is the case.
- 1.1. The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
- 1.11. The world is determined by the facts, and by their being all the facts.

(2) Wittgenstein (1953):

2. That philosophical concept of meaning has its place in a primitive idea of the way language functions. But one can also say that it is the idea of a language more primitive than ours. ...
5. ... A child uses such primitive forms of language when it learns to talk. Here the teaching of language is not explanation, but training.
6. ... (Uttering a word is like striking a note on the keyboard of the imagination.) But in the language of ['builders'], it is not the purpose of the words to evoke images. (It may, of course, be discovered that that helps to attain the actual purpose.) ...

1.2 Traditional Propositions

(3) $p = \{w_1, \dots, w_n\}^1$

(5) $w = \bigcap \{p_1, \dots, p_n\}$

1

- (4)
- a. $\langle s, \{\}_{mod} \rangle$
 - b. `get_worlds(s):`
`$\forall mod [if s \subseteq mod: MOD.append(mod)]; return MOD$`

1.3 A Computational Model

(6) ²

- a. $\langle (s \& m), Op : t \rangle$
- b. $\text{tell}(s, \text{mod})$:
 $\text{mod} = \text{mod} \cup s$
- c. $\langle (s \& m), Boolean \rangle$
- d. $\text{yn}(s, \text{mod})$:
if $s \subseteq \text{mod}$: return True
if $s \not\subseteq \text{mod}$: return False
- e. $\langle \langle x, s \rangle \& m, \{ \}_s \rangle$
- f. $\text{wh}([\lambda x. s(x)], \text{mod})$:
return $\{s' : \exists c[(s' = [\lambda x. s(x)](c)) \wedge (s' \subseteq \text{mod})]\}$

2 Selection

2.1 s vs. $\{ \}_s$

- (7)
 - a. Jack believes that Jill ran.
 - b. $\text{tell}(\text{believe}(e), \text{mod}) \wedge \text{tell}(\text{pat}(e, \text{mod}'), \text{mod}) \wedge \text{tell}(\text{'Jill ran'}, \text{mod}')$
 - c. $\lambda s . \text{tell}(\text{believe}(e), \text{mod}) \wedge \text{tell}(\text{pat}(e, \text{mod}'), \text{mod}) \wedge \text{tell}(s, \text{mod}')$
 - d. $\langle s, \langle (x), Op : t \rangle \rangle$
- (8)
 - a. Jack loves that Jill ran.
 - b. $\text{tell}(\text{love}(e), \text{mod}) \wedge \text{tell}(\text{pat}(e, \text{'Jill ran'}), \text{mod})$
 $[\wedge \text{tell}(\text{'Jill ran'}, \text{mod}')$
 - c. $\lambda s . \text{tell}(\text{love}(e), \text{mod}) \wedge \text{tell}(\text{pat}(e, s), \text{mod})$
 - d. $\langle s, \langle (x), Op : t \rangle \rangle$
- (9)
 - a. *Jack loves Jill ran.
 - b. Jack is surprised Jill ran.
- (10)
 - a. $\text{tell}(\text{pat}(e, \text{'Jill ran'}), \text{mod}) = \text{mod} \cup \text{pat}(e, e')$
 - b. $e' = \iota e [\{\text{run}(e), \text{ag}(e, \text{Jill})\} \subseteq \text{mod}']$
 - c. return e where $\{\text{run}(e), \text{ag}(e, \text{Jill})\} \subseteq \text{mod}'$

²Modeled by basically any language with an “interactive environment”, i.e. LISP, Prolog, Powerloom, Python, SQL.

- d. $\text{tell}(\{\text{run}(e), \text{ag}(e, \text{Jill})\}, \text{mod})?$
- (11) a. Jack wonders who ran.
 b. $\text{tell}(\text{wonder}(e), \text{mod}) \wedge \text{tell}(\text{pat}(e, \text{wh}([\lambda x. x \text{ ran}], \text{mod}')), \text{mod})$
 c. $\text{wh}([\lambda x. x \text{ ran}], \text{mod}): \text{return } \{s: \exists c[(s = [\lambda x. x \text{ ran}](c)) \wedge (s \subseteq \text{mod})]\}$
 d. $\lambda S . \text{tell}(\text{wonder}(e), \text{mod}) \wedge \text{tell}(\text{pat}(e, S), \text{mod})$
 e. $\langle \{ \}_s, \langle (x), Op : t \rangle$
- (12) a. Jack wonders whether Jill ran.
 b. $\text{tell}(\text{wonder}(e), \text{mod}) \wedge \text{tell}(\text{pat}(e, \{\text{'Jill ran'}, \neg\text{'Jill ran'}\}), \text{mod})$
 c. $\lambda S . \text{tell}(\text{wonder}(e), \text{mod}) \wedge \text{tell}(\text{pat}(e, S), \text{mod})$
 d. $\langle \{ \}_s, \langle (x), Op : t \rangle \rangle$
 e. $\llbracket \text{whether} \rrbracket = \lambda s . \{s, \neg s\}$
- (13) Adger and Quer (2001), p. 126:
 ...crucially involves the introduction of a disjunction of propositions, a disjunction that derives from the question that they are built up out of.
- (14) Adger and Quer (2001), p. 128:
 ... the clause is interpreted as a proposition, rather than a set of propositions, ...

2.2 NPI: downward/nonveridical (cf. Giannakidou)

- (15) a. I know who ran.
 b. *I believe who ran.
 c. You won't believe who ran. (negation)
 d. Do you believe who ran? (y/n)
 e. ?I believe who runs. (habitual/generic)
 f. Who believes who ran? (wh)
- (16) a. ?Jack fetched either pail.
 b. Jack didn't fetch either pail. (negation)
 c. Did Jack fetch either pail? (y/n)
 d. Jack fetches either pail. (habitual/generic)
 e. ?Who fetched either pail. (wh)
 f. Jack can fetch either pail. (modal)

- (17) a. I didn't eat any cookies.
 b. $\neg\exists c[\text{I ate } c]. \leftrightarrow \forall c\neg[\text{I ate } c].$
 c. I didn't eat some/a cookie(s).
 d. $\neg\exists c[\text{I ate } c]. \leftrightarrow \forall c\neg[\text{I ate } c].$
 e. $\exists c\neg[\text{I ate } c]. \leftrightarrow \neg\forall c[\text{I ate } c].$
 f. I didn't eat every cookie.
 g. $\neg\forall c[\text{I ate } c]. \leftrightarrow \exists c\neg[\text{I ate } c].$
 h. $\forall c\neg[\text{I ate } c]. \leftrightarrow \neg\exists c[\text{I ate } c].$
- (18) a. Did you eat any cookies?
 b. if $\exists c[\text{you ate } c]$: return True.
 c. ?Who ate any cookies?
 d. ?return $\{s: \exists c'[s=[\lambda x[\exists c[x \text{ ate } c]]](c') \wedge s \subseteq \text{mod}]\}$
 e. ?Every boy didn't eat any cookies.
 f. ?tell($\forall b[\neg\exists c[b \text{ ate } c]]$)
 g. ?tell($\neg\forall b[\exists c[b \text{ ate } c]]$)
 h. ?tell($\neg\exists c[\forall b[b \text{ ate } c]]$)
 i. Some boy didn't eat any cookies.
 j. tell($\exists b[\neg\exists c[b \text{ ate } c]]$)
- (19) a. Pick any card.
 b. Pick any (two) cards.
 c. FCI: singular or plural.
 d. ?I didn't have any card.
 e. I didn't have any cards.
 f. NPI: plural
- (20) a. Did Jack see anyone?
 b. ?Did Jack see any girl?
 c. Did Jack see any girls?
 d. George would kiss any girl(s).

2.3 if vs. whether (and wh-)?

- (21) a. If Jill runs, Jack will know.
b. $A \rightarrow B$
c. ?Whether Jill runs, Jack will know.
d. Whether Jill runs or not, Jack will know.
e. $(A \vee \neg A) \rightarrow B$
f. ?If Jill runs or not, Jack will know.
- (22) Adger and Quer (2001), p. 120, ex. 76,77: (their judgments)
- a. I admitted whether I had committed the crime.
b. #I admitted if I had committed the crime.³
- (23) also see Adger and Quer (2001), section 1.
- a. ?Jack maintained if/whether Jill ran.
b. ?Jack maintained who ran.
c. ?Jack didn't maintain if/whether Jill ran.
d. ?Jack didn't maintain who ran.
- (24) a. ?Jack believed whether/if Jill ran.
b. ?Jack believed who ran.
c. Jack didn't believe whether/if Jill ran.
d. Jack didn't believe who ran.

3 Modals

3.1 NPI

- (25) a. ?Jack would eat any cookie(s).
b. Jack can eat any animal(?s).

3.2 EQ

- (26) a. ?Jack would believe who ate a cookie.
b. JACK would believe who ate the cookies.
c. ?Jack can believe who eats animal(?s).
d. ?JACK can believe who eats animal(?s).

³Is there just a little *irrealis* issue? But (a), for me, also violates the cooperative principle.

4 Conclusions

(27) ⁴

	EQ	NPI
negative	✓	✓
y/n	✓	✓
habitual/generic	X	✓
wh	✓	X
modal	?	?

References

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⁴Consider also:

- (28) a. Agreement
b. Collectives
c. Stativity+Singular
d. There+Specific
e. Achievement+Duration