

Does Electoral Reform Affect Foreign Policy?

The Case of Japanese Agricultural Trade Negotiations

Jarrold Hayes – University of Southern California

Under review: *Journal of East Asian Studies*

Abstract: In the scholarly literature, the effect of electoral structure on foreign policy making is a matter of some question. The 1994 electoral reforms in Japan that resulted in a dramatic change in the electoral power structures provide a unique natural experiment, offering the potential to understand how electoral structure influences foreign policy making. This paper examines Japanese WTO agricultural trade negotiations in light of the 1994 reforms, looking specifically at whether or not Japan's agricultural negotiating position changed after the 1994 electoral reforms. If democratic electoral structure has an impact on the Japan's trade negotiating position, it will do so by reconfiguring the domestic pressures against trade liberalization, producing a different equilibrium point between domestic and international pressures. This paper finds that the Japanese negotiating position does not change after the 1994 reforms, raising questions regarding the impact of democratic electoral structures on foreign policy. The finding has a range of implications that are explored in the paper and create an agenda for future research.

Keywords: foreign policy, Japan, electoral reform, trade policy, agriculture, WTO

INTRODUCTION

In 1994, an eight party coalition in the Japanese Diet, having unseated the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) for the first time since World War II, undertook a unique experiment: they changed Japan's electoral structure. Prior to 1994, the Japanese elected their officials under a multimember district (MMD) system, where each electoral district sent between two and six representatives to the Diet. The coalition changed Japan's electoral system to a combination of single member districts and closed party list proportional representation. They also undertook a significant redistribution of electoral weight away from rural constituencies towards urban centers. This dramatic shift in the electoral foundations of government provides an opportunity to probe the possible influence of domestic electoral structure on economic foreign policy.

This article speaks to two significant weaknesses in the literature: the role of electoral structure in foreign policy formation and the policy impact of Japan's 1994 electoral reforms. Using the Japanese electoral reforms as an approximation of a natural experiment, I examine the possible influence of Japan's democratic electoral system on foreign policy formulation. This article narrows the focus to Japan's agricultural negotiating position in GATT/WTO trade rounds before and after the 1994 electoral reforms. Agriculture in the context of GATT/WTO trade rounds offers a unique analytical opportunity. Agriculture is the most autarkic of Japan's economic sectors: Japanese political leaders have long protected, and benefited from, the agricultural sector at the expense of consumers (Mulgan 2005). Agriculture is also a policy area

where economic models lead us to expect a divergence of trade policy preferences between rural and urban constituencies. Rural constituencies should favor the guarantees on production demand and higher commodity prices that accompany protectionist trade policies while urban interests should favor lower commodity prices and ease of produce availability accompanying free trade policies. If the 1994 reforms have a policy impact, we should expect agriculture policy to demonstrate significant change. The trade rounds provide a relatively stable foundation in terms of the rules governing interaction and the international pressures faced by the Japanese government, limiting possibly conflating variables. Analysis within the context of the GATT/WTO holds the international institutional milieu constant, allowing us to isolate the influence of domestic institutions (Chorev 2007).

The hypothesis tested here is a simple but relatively neglected one: if electoral structure influences foreign policy formation, then foreign policy should reflect the interests of electorally empowered groups. When electoral systems accurately manifest the ‘one person, one vote’ principle, the influence of electoral structure should flow from demographic or issue preference distributions within the population. In situations where the electoral structure gives preferential weight to some voters, foreign policy would reflect the interests of the electorally empowered groups. In these cases, reforms altering the electoral distribution of power should produce a shift between pre-reform and post-reform policies. As I will discuss in detail later, the pre-1994 Japanese electoral system artificially weighted the votes of rural voters over their urban brethren by a significant degree. The 1994 reforms altered that situation and consequently provide an excellent opportunity to examine the role of electoral structure on foreign policy formation.

The paper proceeds in three sections. First, I develop the model to be applied to the Japan case. Second, I examine Japanese agricultural trade positions in the GATT/WTO trade rounds preceding and following the 1994 electoral changes. Analysis here shows Japan’s agriculture trade policy to be remarkably consistent, contravening the hypothesis. The third section of the paper examines possible explanations for the policy continuity.

ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND FOREIGN POLICY

The hypothesis—if electoral structure influences foreign policy formation, then foreign policy should reflect the interests of electorally empowered groups—makes two key assumptions. The first is that political leaders take their policy cues from the preferences of their constituents (Bobrow 1989). In Japan, Bobrow notes that the LDP goes to great lengths to avoid defying public opinion and that foreign policy formation has traditionally emphasized consensus. Policy as a product of politicians sensitive to demands from their elective constituencies should reflect changes in domestic electoral power. Arising from standard economic models, the second assumption takes for granted that urban and rural constituencies have different policy preferences arising from divergent economic interests. These assumptions lead us to expect contesting domestic Japanese pressures with respect to agricultural trade policy. Because agricultural activity—an import competing industry likely to suffer under trade liberalization—dominates in rural areas, rural constituencies should favor protectionist policies (Revenga 1992, 1997; Bernard, Jensen, and Schott 2006). In urban areas, export-oriented and trade neutral economic activities play a more dominant role. These constituencies should favor trade liberalization

because it directly benefits urban and metropolitan economies (Kilkenny 1993).¹ Beaulieu summarizes the political results: “political ‘cleavages’ are determined by the distributional consequences of trade policy” (Beaulieu 2002).

The nature of the electoral structure—particularly the distribution of electoral power—produces a domestic political power equilibrium. Those industries or factors favoring trade liberalization balance against those opposed. This equilibrium in turn balances against international trade pressures to produce the state’s negotiating position. If democratic electoral structure influences trade policy, it will do so by reconfiguring the domestic pressures for and against trade liberalization, producing a different equilibrium point between domestic and international pressures. The argument here bears some resemblance to the integrative international/domestic framework proposed in Choev’s study of U.S. trade policy formation (Choev 2007). In the Japanese case, this shifted equilibrium point should produce changes in Japanese trade position relative to the electoral reforms. Since the electoral reforms of 1994 shifted significant electoral weight to urban voters (Davis 2003; Mulgan 2005), the expectation is that Japan would adopt a trade policy position more amenable to agricultural trade liberalization post-reform.²

There are economic reasons to expect different constituencies will have different trade preferences. The Stolper-Samuelson factor endowment model suggests that changes in political power between constituencies with different factor endowments (capital, including intellectual capital, versus land versus labor) should produce significant changes in trade policy (Rogowski 1987; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Beaulieu and Magee 2004; Beaulieu 2002; Stolper and Samuelson 1941).³ The Cairnes style specific-factors economic model, emphasizing the importance of industry type (export oriented versus import competing), also seems to imply shifts in political power along industrial lines should produce changes in trade policy (Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Irwin 1994; Magee 1980; Cairnes 1874; Frieden 1991; Gourevitch 1986).

These models speak to the interests of particular economic groups in free or restricted trade, not the policy role of electoral structure.⁴ They suggest what we should expect if electoral structure changes produce shifts in political power that favor certain economic groups over others. Under these theories, a shift in power away from rural constituencies towards urban constituencies should produce a more open trade policy. As a capital-rich country, capital intensive industries in Japan stand to benefit from liberalized trade. From the factor endowments perspective, urban constituencies tend to be more capital intensive (higher levels of manufacturing and education, physical and human capital respectively) and consequently should favor freer trade. Rural areas, dominated by land and labor intensive industries, would be at a disadvantage on the world market and thus oppose trade liberalization. The specific factors model also suggests that the shift in political power to urban constituencies should induce freer

¹ Through lower food prices, higher employment, and lower taxes (since urban and metropolitan taxes fund farm subsidies). In the case of food prices, the International Monetary Fund estimates that Japanese protectionism elevates the domestic prices 150% over international food prices (2004).

² Before the 1994 electoral change the rural voters held a 3:1 vote weight superiority over rural voters, afterward the differential shrank to 2:1 (Horiuchi and Saito 2003; George 1991).

³ This is also known as the Factor-Industry Detachment Corollary (Leamer and Levinsohn 1995)

⁴ Although the economic literature has made use of domestic politics in efforts to determine which model—Stolper-Samuelson or Cairnes—has more explanatory power (Brock and Magee 1978; Magee 1980).

trade. By shifting political power from rural areas where import competing sectors dominate—as agriculture is in most developed countries—to urban constituencies where export oriented industries (manufacturing, technology) or non-trading industries (services) are more predominant, the electoral system should incentivize trade liberalization (Mayda and Rodrik 2005).

A related dynamic also plays a role in shaping the policy positions of politicians. The electoral system in part determines the composition of the electoral constituency. Under the multimember system, political aspirants need only secure enough support to surpass the electoral threshold. To succeed, policy positions needed to appeal to the parochial concerns of politicians' small, organized 'constituencies.' Single member districts produce a different dynamic. The basis for political support by necessity broadens dramatically. No longer would the support of a narrow-interest minority guarantee election; politicians have to appeal to broader constituencies to achieve the plurality required to secure office (Krauss and Pekkanen 2004). In the Japanese case, the effect is to dramatically reduce the electoral sway of agricultural interests as political aspirants target their policies to a broader audience (Sasada 2008; Mulgan 2005). Mulgan notes that the expectation of diminished agricultural power is universal: even the Chairman of Nokyo's political arm admits that the reforms significantly limits the organization's ability to send to the Diet members with strong agricultural backgrounds and interests (Mulgan 2005).⁵ While the literature pays limited attention to this dynamic, there is evidence that the reforms have had the anticipated effect (Carlson 2006).

The costs imposed by Japanese agriculture protectionism lend weight to the predictions of the economic models regarding anticipated policy shifts on agricultural trade arising from the electoral reforms. In 2004, during the heart of Doha negotiations, Japanese consumers were estimated to transfer ¥5 trillion (\$46.25 billion at average 2004 exchange rates) to Japanese agricultural producers through higher domestic food costs (Tangermann 2004). The Japanese consumer price support to producers was three times that of the United States (\$15 billion) but less than that paid by European consumers (\$75.64 billion). Per capita, the cost of Japanese agricultural protection clearly exceeds that of both U.S. and E.U. Using OECD 2004 numbers and population estimates, Japanese per capita paid approximately \$360 per year in higher food costs arising from agricultural protection while Americans paid \$51 and Europeans paid \$165. While not overwhelming, the cost to Japanese consumers—nearly 5% of yearly food expenditure—is not negligible either (Japan Statistical Yearbook 2006).⁶

From a foreign policy perspective, the literature rarely comments directly on the impact of electoral structure on foreign policy. Indeed, it has only been relatively recently that political scientists have found substantial evidence that the public has a significant impact on the formulation of foreign policy (Holsti 1992). Given that context, it is not surprising that there is a small body of work addressing (usually tangentially) the issue. While not directly related to electoral structure, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and his coauthors' work on the importance of selectorates in foreign policy suggests that the size and nature of the population a political leader

⁵ Agricultural interests in Japan have a strong, centrally organized union called the Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives, or Nokyo. Farming household membership in Nokyo is universal and gives Nokyo its organizational strength (Mulgan 2000)..

⁶ The Japan Statistical Yearbook lists average monthly expense on food as ¥69,640 (\$644).

is accountable to have important policy ramifications (2004). Jack Snyder's work on the importance of domestic political coalitions in explaining aggressive overexpansion by states also hints at a possible role of electoral structure (1991). David Welch's efforts to explain foreign policy change also peripherally address domestic electoral structure. In particular, his focus on the importance of bureaucracy in stabilizing foreign policy suggests the importance of domestic political structures in general, although not electoral systems in particular (2005). Page, Rabinovich and Tully find that the public in the United States does have significant country specific foreign policy preferences, suggesting a possible role in policy-making, but their work does not investigate how these preferences translate into state policy (2008).

More directly relevant to this paper is Peter Cowhey's work on domestic institutions and international commitments (1993). Cowhey argues that domestic politics and electoral structure play a key role in the provision of collective goods. The MMD Japanese system rewarded politicians for providing private benefits and punishes those who take up collective benefits positions. The reward for private benefits resulted from Japan's single non-transferable vote (SNTV) and MMD. For a party to win a majority of seats in the Diet, it had to run multiple candidates in each district. Since candidates from the same party fought for the same votes, running on a party-wide policy platform or a public benefits campaign would result in candidates from the same party undercutting each other. Instead, the candidates won by "building a dedicated minority block of voters cultivated largely by extensive campaign spending and lavish patronage politics" (Cowhey 1993). Combined with the three-to-one weight advantage held by rural—mostly agricultural or agricultural sympathetic—voters, the impact on Japan's agricultural negotiating position was against trade liberalization (Davis 2003). The LDP in particular relied on support from farmers to win elections and when the LDP strayed from the agricultural fold, farmers were able to electorally punish the party (Curtis 1999). Leaders in rural areas took advantage of community solidarity to turnout voters. High cohesiveness in voting and high turnout combined with a weighted vote made rural areas politically powerful. .

More recently, Sasada directly addresses the linkage between electoral system and foreign policy (Sasada 2008). Arguing that the shift from MMD to single member districts should widen the constituency demographic political candidates must appeal—decreasing the influence of agricultural interests—Sasada finds that indeed Japanese trade policy has made a dramatic shift since the 1994 reforms. Japanese policy makers have begun to focus on export promotion over more defensive protectionist measures. Like this paper, Sasada focuses on Japan's economic (trade) foreign policy in agriculture and utilizes the 1994 reforms as a break point for examining the role of electoral structure in foreign policy. However, this paper differs from Sasada's in significant ways. First, the policy context is different, the focus in this paper being Japanese behavior in the GATT/WTO trade rounds while Sasada's is more general. Second, Sasada's theoretical framework focuses exclusively on the role that wider constituency bases have on policy, while this paper also incorporates policy expectations arising out of economic theory. Finally, the results of my inquiry do not agree with those of Sasada.

THE JAPAN CASE

The pre-1994 electoral system was an acknowledged problem in Japan (Christensen 1994). The rural/urban electoral disjuncture gave disproportionate strength to rural policy

preferences. The MMD SNTV system had members of the same party competing within districts. Japan's politicians and ruling LDP party were widely recognized as captive to agricultural interests and an electoral strategy designed to keep those agricultural interests voting LDP (George 1981). Agricultural interests were able to dominate trade policy for two reasons. The first was the ability of agricultural organizations to deliver cohesive voting blocks—electoral gold in the intraparty competition of Japan's SNTV MMD system. Second, a decades long migration of the population from rural to urban districts created an electoral imbalance in favor of rural districts. The scale of the disproportionate representational weight held by rural districts suggests that this feature of the electoral system played a critical role in generating farmers' voting power by masking declining populations in Japan's agricultural sector (Mulgan 1997, Mulgan 2005). Before 1994, there had been no significant attempt to account for the dramatic shifts in population to urban centers by rebalancing representation in the Diet. The combination of these two factors can be seen in the dominant position of politicians associated with agriculture in the Diet. Before the reforms, nearly fifty percent of the Diet representatives could be classified as 'agricultural representatives.' Of these, sixty percent were from the overrepresented rural or semirural districts (George 1991).

The 1994 electoral reforms sought to construct a system of competitive party elections where parties would alternate in power and focus on the substance of policy rather than on parochial interests (Curtis 1999; Horiuchi and Saito 2003; Reilly 2007). With this goal, the reformers implemented a mixed electoral system, electing 300 seats from single member districts and 200 seats from party list proportional representation. Redistricting to accommodate the reforms narrowed the rural electoral weight advantage to two-to-one. These changes should shift domestic political power to urban voters in two ways. First, the elimination of the SNTV MMD system should encourage politicians to focus on the median Japanese (overwhelmingly urban) voter and their interests. Second, the redistricting dramatically reduced a key electoral lever (overweighed rural districts) used by agricultural interests to hold sway over trade policy (George 1981). Mulgan estimates in the lower house of the Diet 20 seats shifted to more urbanized prefectures while less urbanized prefectures lost 17 seats, for a total seat swing of 37 seats out of 300 district level seats (Mulgan 1997).

Efforts to ascertain the effects of electoral reform on the Japanese political system reveal a tripartite split. Some have found the reforms ineffective in altering the Japanese political dynamic. Huang finds that the anticipated effects of the reforms were dramatically overstated, and that Japanese politicians still rely on private benefits to win office (Huang 1996). Christiansen and Hideo both find that Japanese campaign behavior remains as focused on personalistic vote gathering as it did before the reforms (Christensen 1998; Hideo 1998). Examining party representation in the Diet before and after the elections as well as other reform issues like policy oriented campaigns, Seligmann finds little change. Party representations remain roughly the same before and after the reforms (LDP dominant) and policy issues expected to define campaigns at the district level were notably absent (Seligmann 1997).

Perhaps indicating a lag in effects, scholars writing later do not share these assessments. Horiuchi and Saito find that the electoral reforms did have an impact on the allocation of public resources, suggesting that the reforms did have significant policy and political power effects (Horiuchi and Saito 2003). Examining the political dynamics of constituency representation in

Japan before and after the reforms, Hirano finds that the reforms successfully broadened the constituency representation, both geographically and ideologically, of Japanese Diet members (2006).⁷ Sasada too finds the effect of reforms delayed, with policy repercussions only apparent in 2003 (2008). Finally, Estevez-Abe finds that the reforms have had a dramatic impact on the intraparty dynamic of LDP as well as moving the country toward a Westminster-type strong party parliamentary system (2006).

A final set of scholars chart a middle path, finding a mix of change and continuity in the Japanese system. Carlson finds that while personalistic electoral structures, called *koenkai*, designed to funnel money and votes to individual candidates decreased in electoral relevance, their role in Japanese electoral politics remains similar to that played pre-reform (Carlson 2006). Krauss and Pekkanen also find that, while changed by the reforms, *koenkai* (as well as party factions and party policy committees) still play an active role in Japanese politics (Krauss and Pekkanen 2004). Examining agriculture trade policy, Mulgan notes that the current trade policy environment is marked by significant change and continuity. Post-reform, the Prime Minister's office has grown in its policy-making capacity at the cost of the bureaucracy and party-based policy-making apparatuses, the pre-reform sources of protectionist agriculture policy. The reforms also reduced the sway of the agriculture lobby as the electoral weight advantage of rural areas decreased and the SMD forces political candidates to broaden their policy appeal. However, consistent with pre-reform dynamics, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forests, and Fisheries (MAFF) and party-based policy committees still play a significant policy role and the agriculture lobby maintains some political potency (Mulgan 2005).

While the literature comprehensively addresses the domestic political effects of the reform, the policy effects are comparatively underexamined and the few efforts to examine policy effects have produced mixed results. On the effects of the reforms on agriculture trade policy, Mulgan and Sasada—the only two authors who directly address the issue—seem to disagree. While Mulgan is skeptical of the impact of the reforms, Sasada finds a significant impact. Although their focus is on domestic policy, Horiuchi and Saito generally agree with Sasada on the potency of the reforms. While this study can by no means conclusively address these divisions, it does present an important addition to the reforms and their policy impact.

The following table summarizes the theoretical expectations regarding Japanese trade policy in the WTO trade negotiations pre and post-reform.

Table 1

Pre-1994 reform	Political Effect	Policy Effect
Electoral structure weights rural votes 3-1 over urban votes	Rural, predominantly agricultural, constituencies have disproportionate political weight. Combined with reason to mobilize (bearing cost of trade liberalization) (Revenga 1992) they exert tremendous influence over political parties, notably the LDP.	Protectionist agriculture trade policy, reflecting the interests of rural, agricultural constituencies. Japanese negotiators resist agricultural trade liberalization in the GATT

⁷ Indicated by geographic changes in vote concentration and public expenditure (Hirano 2006).

		Uruguay Round
MMD electoral structure	MMDs emphasize parochial concerns over public benefits. Politicians win based on rallying specific communities to vote based on promises of private benefits (Myerson 1993; Hirano 2006; Mulgan 2005). Rural constituencies with strong interests that would disproportionately bear the costs of agriculture trade liberalization carry disproportionate political weight.	Trade policy disproportionately influenced by agricultural constituencies reflects their economic and policy interests

Post-1994 reform	Political Effect	Policy Effect
Electoral structure decreases rural vote weight to 2-1 vis-à-vis urban votes	Political weight of rural districts drops dramatically. Pre-reform (1990 census figures), rural voters, numbering only about 27 million, carried the voter weight of 81 million as compared to urban voter weight of 98 million (total electoral weight of 179 million). Rural voters made up 22 percent of the electorate but carried 45 percent of the total electoral weight. After the reform, rural voters carried a voter weight of 54 million versus 98 million for urban voters, decreasing their share of the total electoral weight from 45 percent to 35 percent.	Japanese agricultural trade policy adopts a more liberal position in line with the economic and policy interests of empowered urban voters. Japanese negotiators less resistant to agricultural trade liberalization in the WTO Doha Round compared to the Uruguay Round.
Electoral structure of single member districts and party list	Single member districts require politicians to widen their policy appeal, making it less parochial (Myerson 1993; Hirano 2006; Sasada 2008; Mulgan 2005). National level party list forces parties to appeal to the national, heavily urban, public interest. Rural, agricultural constituencies lose the electoral power magnifying effect of MMDs.	Japanese agricultural trade policy adopts a more open position in line with the public interest arising from the overwhelming predominance of urban constituencies.

*Japan in Uruguay Round*⁸

Japan's pre-1994 agriculture trade negotiating position is critical to establishing a baseline to evaluate post-reform behavior. Japan's initial Uruguay Round proposal for agriculture negotiations outlined a two-pronged approach for defending agriculture policy. First, Japan emphasized non-economic aspects of agriculture such as employment, food security, and environmental protection necessitating the maintenance of import trade barriers. Of importance within these non-economic considerations was the protection of domestic production of 'basic foodstuffs' constituting a critical source of nutrition for the public, particularly rice (WTO Secretariat 1990). The second leg of the Japanese negotiating position was a focus on the elimination of export subsidies. Rather than defending Japanese agricultural positions outright, the export subsidy approach takes advantage of Japan's strength on the issue to redirect focus away from import restrictions and towards the trade distorting export policies of other states.⁹

⁸ The Uruguay round ran from September 1986 to April 1994.

⁹ As of 1995, the earliest year available from the World Trade Organization, Japanese export subsidies were zero and have remained at that level since (WTO Secretariat 2002).

Over twenty percent of the Japanese proposal focuses on the elimination of export subsidies. A possible third leg of the Japanese position may be the Japanese argument against the development of a comprehensive aggregate measurement of the level of protection (Government of Japan 1987). Such a measure would identify and quantify Japanese non-tariff barriers, putting Japanese trade negotiators on the defensive as well as enhancing the visibility of import restrictions.

The Japanese displayed remarkable consistency in their negotiating position throughout the round; the initial proposal was more than an opening gambit, it was the bedrock of the Japanese position. Across years and documents, the Japanese remained focused on the non-economic aspects of agriculture and the elimination of export subsidies (Government of Japan 1988; WTO Secretariat 1990; Government of Japan 1990). A 1990 WTO Secretariat summary of the Japanese position based on negotiating proposals submitted after the Mid-Term Review Agreement reflects Japan's commitment to the non-economic aspects of agriculture and export subsidy elimination. While the Japanese accepted a quantification of protection (known as an Aggregate Measure of Support or AMS), Tokyo's position on non-economic aspects of agriculture and export subsidy elimination remained unchanged (WTO Secretariat 1990). The Secretariat's proposal summary makes clear that Japan was alone among the developed nations in its efforts to maintain strong internal agricultural protections.

The constancy of the Japanese position is notable in the context of the international pressure placed on Japan throughout the negotiation. Both the U.S., Japan's most important trading partner at the time (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2006), and the Cairns Group of exporting nations put significant pressure on Japan to liberalize its agricultural sector (Josling et al. 1994).¹⁰ Media reports from the period of the negotiations suggest the pressure Japan was facing. The United States and other farm exporting countries complained loudly about Japan's failure to propose reductions in tariffs on key agricultural goods. A U.S. assistant secretary of state indicated that the United States was "disappointed" over Japan's failure to liberalize its agriculture market. Japan's failure to open up its rice market was also pointed to as a factor behind the "stalled" trade round (Jiji Press Ticker Service 1990). Australia criticized Japan's agricultural tariff scheme for its "gaps and exceptions" (Zarocostas 1992). Given Japan's intransigence in the face of clear international pressure, it seems safe to conclude that strong domestic support bulwarked the Japanese position.

Little attention has been paid in the literature to Japan's agricultural negotiating behavior in the Uruguay Round beyond boilerplate observations that Japan opposed agricultural trade liberalization (Hathaway and Ingco 1995). Christina Davis' text on free trade is an exception, and supports the assessment here of Japan's position and the forces behind it (2003). Davis notes that the agriculture issue would draw domestic fire for the government. In the run up to the Uruguay trade round, the Diet passed resolutions opposing agricultural liberalization and calling for self-sufficiency in agricultural production. The bureaucracy, particularly the MAFF, and *all* the political parties opposed agricultural reform. Consequently, Japan agreed to include agriculture in the trade negotiations reluctantly. Once in the trade negotiations, Japan took a low

¹⁰ The Cairns Group consists of 19 agricultural exporting countries including Australia, Canada, South Africa, and most of South America.

profile in the agricultural negotiating group and showed little initiative in proposing reforms of Japanese agriculture trade.

Japan sought to use issue linkage to divert attention away from agriculture and force liberalizers to compromise for the sake of the larger trade package. When pressured by the U.S. for agricultural liberalization, Tokyo countered by insisting on reforms by other nations as a precursor to Japanese compromise. In particular, Japan focused on export subsidies. Throughout the Uruguay Round, Japan demonstrated remarkable strength in its resistance to foreign pressure. During the first Gulf War, as Japan was under fire from the United States for failing to provide troops in the conflict, when President George H.W. Bush pressured Japan's foreign minister to show flexibility on agricultural issues, Tokyo held firm. Ultimately, Japan did agree to some agricultural liberalization, but only after constituencies within Japan—particularly business—that normally deferred to the agricultural sector pressured for liberalization, consequently allowing international pressure a measure of success (Davis 2003).

Media reports support the claim made here that strong domestic pressures balanced against international forces to produce the Japanese negotiating position. The agriculture lobby played a significant role in generating domestic pressure against liberalization. In 1990, a Japanese governmental advisory panel recommended rice liberalization and was rebuffed by agricultural interests. As a result, the panel declared it would stay out of the Japanese government's agricultural trade negotiations (Japan Economic Newswire 1990). A year later the Herald Sun reported the Japanese government under "immense" pressure from the politically powerful farm lobby to hold a strong line against agricultural trade liberalization (Franklin 1991). The *Daily Yomiuri* noted in 1992 that the eventual capitulation to foreign pressure on rice liberalization and the resulting backlash from Japanese farmers would make the job of the minister of agriculture a difficult one (The Daily Yomiuri 1992). Late in the Uruguay Round Japan was seen as willing to let the negotiations fail to appease the farm vote (Silk 1992).

In the end, Japan did agree to tariff reductions and the elimination or tariffication of non-tariff border measures on agricultural products (World Trade Organization 2008). The eventual Uruguay agreement did mark a significant compromise on the initial, strongly resistant, Japanese position on tariffication. It is clear that the U.S. and other agriculture exporting countries were putting significant international pressure on Japan to liberalize its agriculture imports. On the other side of the pressure equation were Japan's farmers, who through their disproportionate electoral weight were able to bring significant pressure to bear on the government in opposition to agricultural trade liberalization. The resulting negotiating position of the government was inflexible and opposed to liberalization.

Japan in Doha Round¹¹

In the Uruguay Round, Japan avoided addressing import liberalization by focusing on the non-economic aspects of agriculture and export subsidy elimination. It was only when internal interest groups reconfigured the domestic political dynamic and added their weight to international pressures did Japan finally capitulate to limited agricultural import liberalization.

¹¹ The Doha Development round, still in progress, began with the November, 2001 ministerial meeting in Doha, Qatar.

The calculus behind the Japanese negotiating position in the Uruguay Round supports the argument presented here: internal agriculture sector pressure balanced against international pressure to produce the Japanese position. When the domestic dynamic changed, the Japanese position changed. If this pattern holds for the Doha Round, Japan's positions in the Uruguay and Doha Rounds should differ significantly. The 1994 electoral reforms shifted some of the rural vote weight to urban voters as well as changed the electoral incentives for parties and individual politicians to establish comprehensive policy platforms. Under these conditions, the framework proposed by this paper predicts that the Japanese position in the Doha Round should be more flexible and open to liberalization.

Much as in the Uruguay Round, Japanese politicians made political moves prior to the start of the trade round that would prove indicative of later negotiating positions. Before the start of the Doha Round and five years after electoral reforms, the Japanese government passed the Basic Law on Food, Agriculture, and Rural Areas. The law echoes the non-economic arguments of the Uruguay Round and strongly focuses on domestic agricultural production with little mention of the role agricultural trade plays in the Japanese food supply. This focus comes despite the law's avowed goal of procuring a stable food supply at reasonable prices (Ministry of Agriculture 2000). The law encapsulates the contradictory nature of Japanese agriculture policy: agricultural protection despite recognition that prices and supply are of critical importance to Japanese consumers.

In the Doha Round, agriculture is central to the negotiations. The Canadian Council on International Co-operation (CCIC) identifies agriculture as a "litmus test on the WTO's commitment to development" (2003). The initial Japanese Doha Round negotiating proposal presents a dominant focus on agriculture multifunctionality, food security, and "addressing the imbalance between rules and disciplines applied to agricultural exporting countries and those applied to importing countries," i.e. eliminating export subsidies (Government of Japan 2000).¹² Multifunctionality is the descendent of the non-economic aspects of agriculture argument used in the Uruguay Round while the food security and focus on export tariffs arguments are unaltered carryovers. In the case of multifunctionality, the Japanese proposal clearly indicates the protectionist implications; "in order to secure the benefits of the multifunctionality of agriculture, a certain level of policy intervention (domestic support) is indispensable" (Government of Japan 2000).

Superficially, there seem to be indications that the Japanese negotiators have liberalized their position vis-à-vis the Uruguay Round. Two of the five principle points of negotiation call for consideration of developing countries and consumers. However, the impression of flexibility is illusory. The Japanese proposals regarding developing countries reflect Japanese interest in maintaining domestic protections and cementing food security. The proposal fails to mention market access, a critical issue for developing, agrarian states. Likewise, when addressing the concerns of consumers, the Japanese proposal focuses on food security, quality, and labeling, issues complimentary to the larger goal of import protection. Neglected are issues contrary to the Japanese approach, including food price and diversity. Essentially, the Japanese government

¹² According to the Japanese proposal, "The multifunctionality of agriculture is a concept which explains that agriculture is an economic activity that not only produces food and fiber but also creates both tangible and intangible values, which are embodied in various ways in each country" (Government of Japan 2000).

position on agriculture import liberalization remained at approximately the position it staked out 14 years previous.

The Japanese negotiating proposal represents the foundation of the Japanese approach rather than an opening gambit designed to give negotiators advantage in compromise. Throughout the Doha Round, Japanese negotiators have remained faithful to the initial negotiating proposal. At the Cancún ministerial meeting in 2003, talks broke down around the so-called Singapore issues.¹³ As was the case in the Uruguay Round, Japan employed issue linkage to connect movement on the Singapore issues to concessions on agriculture liberalization. In contrast, developing countries pressed for agricultural liberalization as an independent and central issue. The developed countries failed to move on agriculture trade liberalization, and the Cancún talks fell apart (Canadian Council for International Co-operation 2003).

The issues of agricultural multifunctionality and export subsidies form a consistent basis for Japanese negotiations. While Japanese statements typically include language of liberalization and expansion of WTO capabilities, the bedrock issues of multifunctionality and export subsidies are omnipresent. Shortly before the Cancún meetings, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) issued a statement urging other countries to put forward, "initiatives...with a view to maintaining and strengthening the multilateral trading system by not only trade liberalization but also the review, reinforcement and expansion of the WTO rules and the inclusion of new issues such as investment in the negotiations." The statement seems to represent a departure from the initial Japanese negotiating position, albeit with a hint of issue linkage in the reference to the inclusion of new issues. However, in addressing agriculture specifically, the statement repeats calls for the consideration of the "multifunctionality" as well as "balance between importing and exporting countries in their rights and obligations" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2003). As with other statements, the MOFA release makes no mention of agricultural import liberalization. The MOFA positional statement exemplifies the agriculture liberalization avoidance strategy: focus on how agriculture is a "multifunctional" trade sector that deserves special treatment, divert attention away from import liberalization to other trade issues such as export regulation, and attempt to tie agriculture into a broader framework.

As with the initial negotiating proposal, the 2003 MOFA position paper does express concern for the situation of developing countries: "[d]ue consideration is yet required for the interests and concerns of developing countries in this process." However, Tokyo's 'consideration' for developing countries does not extend to agriculture liberalization. Japan's position on developing countries includes urging them to become more deeply integrated in the WTO system and vows to provide technical assistance to that end. Japan also expressed dedication to building trust and enabling improved access to pharmaceuticals, but makes no mention of agriculture. Japan's 'tribute' to developing countries ignores one of their most important issues: agricultural import liberalization.

¹³ The term "Singapore issues" refers to a 1996 WTO ministerial meeting held in Singapore centrally concerned with the issues of trade and investment, trade and competition policy, government procurement practices (transparency), and simplifying trade procedures (World Trade Organization 1996).

In the Uruguay Round, the resistance to agricultural liberalization stretched across the political and bureaucratic spectrum. Similarly, the Doha Round has seen a convergence of Japanese bureaucratic positions. Balancing the demands of importing and exporting nations and agricultural multifunctionality are regular themes in statements and press releases from both the MAFF and the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) (Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries of Japan 2002, 2003, 2003; Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry 2002).

Japanese policy makers have been clear in public regarding protectionist policy. METI minister Akira Amari is on record stating that Japan will “protect what we must protect” (Hirano 2007). Japanese refusal to compromise on rice imports in 2005 was reported as a contributing factor to the general failure of the Hong Kong ministerial meeting. At the time, government officials explicitly rejected arguments for liberalization (Negishi 2005). Japanese refusal to yield on agriculture comes in the context of significant international pressure. The overwhelming focus of the Doha Round on agriculture is a critical source of pressure, as are other governments (Becker 2004; Weisman 2007). At the 2007 APEC ministerial meeting Japan was publicly encouraged to cut farm tariffs (Hirano 2007). After 2003 talks in Japan failed to bridge differences over agriculture tariff liberalization, then U.S. trade representative Robert Zoellick chastised Japan: “Rice-producing countries can't sell their produce in Japan but Japan can sell its cars in other countries. Is that fair? Japan needs to face reality” (Belson 2003).

Taken together, WTO and Japanese government documents as well as the media reports present a cohesive Japanese position with respect to agriculture in the Doha Round. Import liberalization is not something on which the Japanese government is willing to compromise despite significant international pressure to do so. The Japanese strategy appears to be three fold. First, Japanese negotiations emphasize multifunctionality and benefits of agriculture beyond producing commodities. Second, the Japanese emphasize a broad negotiating framework whenever possible. Outside of the agriculture specific meetings, Japan minimizes discussion of agriculture and plays up other issues. Third, within the context of agricultural liberalization, Japan refuses to consider tariff reductions and instead focuses on increased regulation of agricultural exporting countries, redefining the question of what should be the next step in global agricultural trade liberalization.

Why No Change?

The consistency of the Japanese trade position presents a significant problem for the rationalist economic framework proposed at the outset. Before I explore possible explanations for this finding, three challenges to the trade round approach should be addressed. The first is that the global trade regime is generally satisfactory from Japan's standpoint, thus leaving it with few incentives to make concessions of any sort. The second is that the tough Japanese negotiating strategy designed to elicit concessions from others before making any concessions itself. The third is that there is a lack of real pressure from the EU or the USA to change positions on agriculture, regardless of what they say in public.

On the first point, previous work on Japanese foreign policy has detailed a foreign policy perspective that strongly takes account of international opinion. Bobrow in particular indicates

that Japanese foreign policy is strongly responsive to international opinion. The central debate on how to respond to international opinion revolves around whether to take a passive ‘go with the flow’ approach or an active approach designed to head off “hostile charges of economic selfishness” (Bobrow 1989). Neither perspective seems amenable to ignoring international demands. In line with Calder’s reactionary state hypothesis, the intense international focus and pressure accompanying the Doha Round should serve as an impetus for policy change even if initial Japanese strategy is to hold fast (Calder 1988). Policy continuity seems to indicate some subsurface dynamic strengthens the Japanese hand. Finally, as a trading nation with limited domestic resources, maintaining an open and stable international trading system is strongly in Japan’s interest. Risking the enmity of developing nations through inflexibility would endanger the very system on which Japan’s economy is so dependent.

Regarding the second point, it is possible that the Japanese are taking a harder line on liberalization as a negotiating tactic. However, it is unlikely that they would be able to do so without domestic support. The Japanese positions have not been secret; they have been very open and publically presented. Drawing on Putnam’s concept of a two level game (Putnam 1988), if domestic policy preferences were for agriculture trade liberalization, the Japanese position would be untenable. Consumer groups, the media, and other interested parties would indicate to both the government and its negotiating partners that the policy at best lacked domestic support and at worst risked significant domestic political damage. Thus, in the context of the Doha Round, while the government may be willing to compromise its trade position once it has received other concessions, the initial position would be untenable without at least tacit domestic support.

Finally, the third point also has problems explaining the Japanese position. Unlike previous trade rounds where Japanese negotiators could parlay concessions on other issues into advantages on agricultural trade, in the Doha Round agriculture occupies the central focus and resolving disagreements over agricultural trade is critical to the Round’s success (Elliott 2006; Narasimhan 2008; Rohter 2006; BBC News 2006). Given the centrality of agriculture to the trade round, it is very likely that Japan faces significant pressure to liberalize agriculture trade policy. Even if the U.S. and Europe are not pushing Japan for liberalization behind the scenes, they are no longer the only economic entities that have the desire and international capacity to force the issue. As evidenced by Japan’s rhetorical tribute to developing countries, rising powers like Brazil and India are pushing hard for agricultural trade liberalization. As a known ‘force of resistance’ in the trade round, it seems unlikely that Japan would escape foreign pressure (Mulgan 2005). Given the lack of issues on the negotiating table, the costs to Japan internationally associated with a recalcitrant trade position are much higher than they were in previous rounds. Accordingly, we should expect the Doha Round to incentivize Japanese flexibility on trade liberalization even more than in previous rounds.

The Japanese agricultural trade negotiating position has remained remarkably consistent over the 20 years that encompass the Uruguay and Doha trade rounds. The 1994 electoral reforms and the attendant domestic political power alignment appear to have had no significant policy impact. The simple model linking electoral structure to foreign policy does not hold up. There is reason to believe that the theoretical assumption of divergent urban/rural policy

preferences is problematic.¹⁴ Hideo hints at it when he argues that there is a general policy alignment within Japanese politics (1998). The implication is that the Japanese populace— independent of economic or demographic factors—generally agrees on policy, a point supported by McAllister’s work on voting cleavages in Japanese society (2007). Recent work pointing to the importance of noneconomic factors, such as community affiliation, identity, and values may help to explain the policy preference convergence (Mayda and Rodrik 2005). Literature linking rice in particular with Japanese identity seems to support the idea that non-economic factors significantly shape trade policy preferences (Ohnuki-Tierney 1993; Ohnuki-Tierney 1995).¹⁵ At least one news report from the Uruguay Round suggests that the cultural argument was a significant factor (Financial Times 1992). Additionally, there are some indications that the basic Japanese political culture is strongly status quo. Consequently, policy changes largely in response to external pressure (Calder 1988). The failure of the 1994 reforms to produce policy change suggests that further attention on the role of domestic identity and culture will serve to enhance our ability to explain trade policy—and foreign policy more broadly.

Although English language translations of polling data are difficult to obtain, particularly in the years after the Roper Center’s JPOLL project stopped collecting data, there is some public opinion poll evidence that supports these ideas. During the Uruguay Round consumers seemed generally skeptical of agriculture trade liberalization. A survey conducted in 1993 found that 86 percent of respondents were conditionally or unwilling to open the Japanese rice market to foreign trade (NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute 1993). In a 1996 poll almost half (45 percent) of the respondents wanted Japanese agriculture to produce as much food as possible to prevent dependence on foreign food sources. A similar number, 43 percent, pointed to lower production costs over food imports as the way to reduce food costs (Central Research Services Inc. 1997). In a more general trade survey from 1994, only 33 percent of respondents unconditionally felt that the Japanese market should open further, and of these only 13 percent indicated that the market should open for price reasons. Conversely, 50 percent of the respondents were unwilling or only conditionally willing to commit to opening Japanese markets further (Shin Joho Center 1994).¹⁶ In a similar 1997 poll, the unconditional response dropped to 29 percent while the price motivated opening response remained the same at 14 percent. As before, 50 percent of the respondents were conditionally or unwilling to commit to further opening of Japan’s markets (Shin Joho Center 1997). Also in 1997, 31 percent of respondents believed that Japan should unconditionally comply with the requests of developing countries to lower tariffs and remove import restriction while 50 percent responded with equivocation (43 percent) or outright protectionism (7 percent) (Shin Joho Center 1997).

Public opinion during the Doha Round also seems to testify to a general Japanese skepticism towards agricultural imports. A 2007 poll found that over 90 percent of respondents either strongly (76.9%) or somewhat (14.6%) felt food origin labeling should be mandatory (Yomiuri Shimbun 2006). While not indicative of opposition to trade liberalization, the result

¹⁴ The political responsiveness assumption enjoys support in the literature, particularly with respect to the political sway of business in trade policy (Pekkanen 2005)

¹⁵ Ohnuki-Tierney notes that historically Japanese rice has served as an identity marker distinguishing the Japanese both from the West and from other rice consuming Asian societies (Ohnuki-Tierney 1995)

¹⁶ In response to the following question: “Because of the large trade imbalance between Japan and the West, Europe and the United States are urging Japan to take further actions to open its market. Which of the following is closest to your thinking on this issue?”

does seem to demonstrate a high level of concern among the public as to the source of their food. In 2008, in the aftermath of a food labeling controversies (Tabuchi 2007), a Yomiuri Shimbun poll found that 57 percent of those who self identified as ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ concerned about food safety were concerned about an increase in imported food. Of all respondents—concerned and unconcerned—place or country of production was of notable concern to 54 percent (Yomiuri Shimbun 2008). To put these numbers in context, the food scandals of the latter half of 2007 focused predominantly on domestic, not foreign, producers. These poll results seem to indicate that, regardless of the trigger, when Japanese consumers are concerned about food quality they include foreign agricultural products in their list of concerns.

The consistent plurality—and often near majority—of the responses that are wary of or outright hostile towards trade liberalization contrasts strongly with demographic characteristics of the Japanese population that would predict more widespread acceptance of trade. In 1995 and 2000 the Japanese census shows 78 percent of the population resident in urban areas (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication Statistics Bureau 2005). This matches up well against a 1996 survey showing 86 percent of respondents indicated they derived no part of their income from agriculture (NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute 1996). Extrapolating from economic models, these statistics suggest that agricultural trade liberalization, and trade liberalization more generally, should be welcome in Japan. The resistance to it evidenced in surveys throughout the 1990’s suggests that trade policy preferences do not vary in the way that economic models suggest they should. The polling data and the consistency of Japanese policy over the electoral disjuncture suggest that significant factors aside from those presented in rational actor economic models shape agriculture trade policy preferences. In particular, the findings here suggest that broadly speaking the Japanese public, regardless of demographic or employment sector, supports agricultural protection and accepts the attendant costs. Consequently, electoral system is irrelevant to the issue because the underlying dynamics do not match the rationalist assumptions underpinning the model.

This finding supports existing literature on the politics of agriculture in Japan. Steven Vogel argues that while standard economic models predict that agriculture consumers and producers should function in opposition, Japan differs in significant ways. While the post World War II economic system is recognized to favor producers, consumers have done remarkably little about it. While consumers have successfully mobilized against corporations and industries, agriculture has remained largely untouched. Indeed, Vogel claims that when the government, responding to international pressure, has sought to liberalize agriculture trade, consumers have *resisted*, citing standard protectionist logic. Vogel examines, albeit briefly, and dismisses the argument that electoral disenfranchisement lies behind consumer pacifism on agricultural matters. Interestingly, while Vogel is writing after the 1994 electoral reforms, he does not use them to leverage his argument. Instead, his focus rest predominantly on the behavior of consumers and consumer groups. This study augments Vogel’s findings by adding an explicitly policy oriented examination. The electoral power shift to consumers should have produced changes in trade policy. It did not, supporting Vogel’s caution that we cannot blindly accept the assumptions of economic models when it comes to understanding the economic behavior of states and their publics (Vogel 1999).

CONCLUSION

The measure of a model can be found in how well it describes, explains, and predicts behavior in the real world. Here, I derived a model based on established economic models and assumptions as to the effect the 1994 electoral reforms would have of Japanese agricultural trade policy. In the end, my model did not accurately describe real world behavior. In exploring why Japanese trade policy in the Doha Round remained consistent with that of the Uruguay round, I found significant evidence to suggest that the underlying economic assumptions about the interests of consumers are problematic; consumers in Japan do not seem to find it in their best interest to lower the cost of agriculture. The 1994 electoral reforms have had no effect on policy because there has been no significant policy preference difference between the disempowered and empowered constituencies within Japan. This suggests that when we try to understand the economic behavior of states in the international system, economic models may leave scholars vulnerable to assessments based on inaccurate assumptions.

Of course, it is possible that consumers will change their policy preferences. There is already some indication that Japanese consumers are increasingly focusing on price as a critical product characteristic in response to prolonged economic difficulties (Mulgan 2005). The real test of the policy impact of Japan's reforms—that is, whether they have electorally empowered consumers in the way rational institutionalism suggests—will arise as consumers shift their policy preferences. Thus, the question that motivated this work—does electoral structure shape foreign policy—as measured through the Japanese reform experience remains difficult to answer. As such, more work, including case studies on other issue areas, is needed to develop a coherent picture.

REFERENCES

- BBC News. 2006. OECD tries to revive Doha talks *BBC News*,
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6041930.stm>.
- Beaulieu, Eugene. 2002. Factor or Industry Cleavages in Trade Policy? An Empirical Analysis of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem. *Economics & Politics* 14 (2):99-131.
- Beaulieu, Eugene, and Christopher Magee. 2004. Four Simple Tests of Campaign Contributions and Trade Policy Preferences. *Economics & Politics* 16 (2):163-187.
- Becker, Elizabeth. 2008. *Farm Subsidies Again Take Front Seat at the W.T.O.* New York Times, 28 July 2004 [cited 27 April 2008]. Available from
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990DE1DB123DF93BA15754C0A9629C8B63&scp=14&sq=japan+doha+agriculture&st=nyt>
- Belson, Ken. 2008. *World Trade Talks in Japan Falter After Three Days.* New York Times 2003 [cited 26 April 2008]. Available from
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E00EFD7113AF934A25751C0A9659C8B63&scp=3&sq=Japan+doha+agriculture&st=nyt>
- Bernard, Andrew B., J. Bradford Jensen, and Peter K. Schott. 2006. Survival of the best fit: Exposure to low-wage countries and the (uneven) growth of U.S. manufacturing plants. *Journal of International Economics* 68 (1):219-237.
- Bobrow, Davis B. 1989. Japan in the World: Opinion from Defeat to Success. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33 (4):571-604.
- Brock, William A., and Stephen P. Magee. 1978. The Economics of Special Interest Politics: The Case of the Tariff. *The American Economic Review* 68 (2):246-250.
- Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph. M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith. 2004. Testing novel implications from the selectorate theory of war. *World Politics* 56 (3):363-+.
- Cairnes, John Elliot. 1874. *Some Leading Principles of Political Economy Newly Expounded.* London: Macmillian.
- Calder, Kent E. 1988. Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State. *World Politics* 40 (4):517-541.
- Canadian Council for International Co-operation. 2008. *Post-Cancun Reflections and Directions: Conference Report 2003* [cited 13 February 2008]. Available from
http://www.ccic.ca/e/docs/002_trade_2003-10_post_cancun_conference_report.pdf
- Carlson, Matthew M. 2006. Electoral reform and the costs of personal support in Japan. *Journal of East Asian Studies* 6 (2):233-259.
- Central Research Services Inc. 2008. *What expectations do you have concerning agriculture and the food supply from farming villages?* University of Connecticut Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, 1 March 1997 [cited 13 February 2008]. Available from
http://roperweb.ropercenter.uconn.edu/cgi-bin/hsrun.exe/Roperweb/JPOLL/StateId/RiAnbmiCWzUWetwLtleIqQnMZOC0y-4gIy/HAHTpage/Summary_Link?RCQU_QSTN_ID=14653
- Chorev, Nitsan. 2007. A fluid divide: Domestic and international factors in US trade policy formation. *Review of International Political Economy* 14 (4):653-689.
- Christensen, Ray. 1998. The Effect of Electoral Reforms on Campaign Practices in Japan: Putting New Wine into Old Bottles. *Asian Survey* 38 (10):986-1004.

- Christensen, Raymond V. 1994. Electoral Reform in Japan: How It was Enacted and Changes It May Bring. *Asian Survey* 34 (7):589-605.
- Cowhey, Peter F. 1993. Domestic Institutions and the Credibility of International Commitments: Japan and the United States. *International Organization* 47 (2):299-326.
- . 1995. The Politics of Foreign Policy in Japan and the United States. In *Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States*, edited by P. F. Cowhey and M. McCubbins. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Curtis, Gerald L. 1999. *The logic of Japanese politics : leaders, institutions, and the limits of change*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Davis, Christina L. 2003. *Food fights over free trade: how international institutions promote agricultural trade liberalization*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Elliott, Kimberly Ann. 2006. *Delivering on Doha : farm trade and the poor*. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development : Institute for International Economics.
- Estevez-Abe, Margarita. 2006. Japan's Shift Toward a Westminster System: A Structural Analysis of the 2005 Lower House Election and Its Aftermath. *Asian Survey* 46 (4):632-651.
- Financial Times. 1992. Last push for Gatt: Financial Times.
- Franklin, M. 1991. Don't Blame Us For Trade Failure Japan: Herald Sun.
- Frieden, Jeffrey A. 1991. *Debt, development, and democracy : modern political economy and Latin America, 1965-1985*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- George, Aurelia. 1991. The Politics of Interest Representation in the Japanese Diet: The Case of Agriculture. *Pacific Affairs* 64 (4):506-528.
- George, Aurelia D. 1981. The Japanese Farm Lobby and Agricultural Policy-Making. *Pacific Affairs* 54 (3):409-430.
- Gourevitch, Peter Alexis. 1986. *Politics in hard times : comparative responses to international economic crises*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Government of Japan. 1987. Japanese Proposal for Negotiations on Agriculture. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Uruguay Round.
- . 1988. Statement by Japan in the Negotiating Group on Agriculture. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Uruguay Round.
- . 1990. Statement of Japan on the Treatment of the Chairman's Draft Text. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Uruguay Round.
- . 2000. Negotiating Proposal by Japan on WTO Agricultural Negotiations. World Trade Organization: The Doha Development Round.
- Hathaway, Dale E., and Merlinda D. Ingco. 1995. Agricultural Liberalization and the Uruguay Round. In *World Bank discussion papers, 307*, edited by W. Martin and L. A. Winters. Washington, D.C: World Bank.
- Hideo, Otake, ed. 1998. *How electoral reform boomeranged: Continuity in Japanese campaigning style*. Vol. 23, *JCIE papers; 23*. Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange.
- Hirano, Ko. 2008. *Agriculture protections a given, at least till after poll*. Japan Times Online, 13 July 2007 [cited 25 April 2008]. Available from <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20070713f2.html>
- Hirano, Shigeo. 2006. Electoral Institutions, Hometowns and Favored Minorities: Evidence from Japanese Electoral Reforms. *World Politics* 58:51-82.

- Holsti, Ole R. 1992. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus Merston Series: Research Programs and Debates. *International Studies Quarterly* 36 (4):439-466.
- Horiuchi, Yusaku, and Jun Saito. 2003. Reapportionment and Redistribution: Consequences of Electoral Reform in Japan. *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (4):669-682.
- Huang, David W. F. 1996. Electoral reform is no panacea: An assessment of Japan's electoral system after the 1994 reform. *Issues & Studies* 32 (10):109-139.
- International Monetary Fund. 2004. Agricultural Trade: Reaping a Rich Harvest from Doha. *Finance & Development*, December, 34-35.
- Irwin, Douglas A. 1994. The Political Economy of Free Trade: Voting in the British General Election of 1906. *Journal of Law and Economics* 37 (1):75-108.
- Japan Economic Newswire. 1990. Advisory Panel Retreats Under Pressure on Rice Issue: Kyodo News Service.
- Japan Statistical Yearbook. 2006. Yearly Average of Monthly Living Expenditures per Household by Yearly Income Quintile Group and Number of Household Members (Two-or-More-Person Households (including Agricultural, Forestry and Fisheries Households) - All Households): Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication Statistics Bureau,.
- Jiji Press Ticker Service. 1990. U.S. Raps Japan, ROK For Farm Trade Policies: Jiji Press Ltd.
- Josling, Tim, Masayoshi Honma, Jaeok Lee, Donald MacLaren, Bill Miner, San Sumner, Stefan Tangermann, and Alberto Valdes. 1994. The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture: An Evaluation. St. Paul, MN: International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium.
- Kilkenny, Maureen. 1993. Rural/Urban Effects of Terminating Farm Subsidies. *American Journal of Agricultural Economics* 75 (4):968-980.
- Krauss, Ellis S., and Robert Pekkanen. 2004. Explaining party adaptation to electoral reform: The discreet charm of the LDP? *Journal of Japanese Studies* 30 (1):1-34.
- Leamer, Edward E., and James Levinsohn. 1995. International Trade Theory: The Evidence. In *Handbook of International Economics* edited by G. M. Grossman and K. Rogoff. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
- Magee, Stephen P. 1980. Three simple tests of the Stolper–Samuelson Theorem. In *Issues in International Economics*, edited by P. Oppenheimer. Stockfield, UK: Oriel Press.
- Mayda, Anna Maria, and Dani Rodrik. 2005. Why are some people (and countries) more protectionist than others? *European Economic Review* 49 (6):1393-1430.
- McAllister, Ian. 2007. Social structure and party support in the East Asian democracies. *Journal of East Asian Studies* 7 (2):225-249.
- Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries of Japan. 2008. *Draft Press Release for NTC-IV Ministerial Meeting*, 14 June 2002 [cited 13 February 2008]. Available from <http://www.maff.go.jp/wto/NTCkaigi/pressrelease.html>
- . 2008. *Minister Kamei's statement in light of the result of the March session of the WTO agriculture negotiations*, 1 April 2003 [cited 25 April 2008]. Available from http://www.maff.go.jp/wto/press_r.htm
- . 2008. *Minister Oshima's reaction to the Chairman's first draft of modalities for the WTO agriculture negotiations*, 13 February 2003 [cited 13 February 2008]. Available from <http://www.maff.go.jp/wto/20030213danwa.pdf>

- Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries., 2008. *The Basic Law on Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas* 2000 [cited 21 April 2008]. Available from <http://www.maff.go.jp/soshiki/kambou/kikaku/NewBLaw/BasicLaw.html>
- Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry. 2002. Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference: Developments Since the Third WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2008. *The Positions taken by the Government of Japan towards the Fifth Session of the WTO Ministerial Conference at Cancún*, August 2003 [cited 13 February 2008]. Available from <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/wto/min03/position.html>
- Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication Statistics Bureau. *Year 2000 census - Primary basic statistical results: Statistical tables* 2005 [cited 3 March 2008. Available from <http://www.stat.go.jp/English/data/kokusei/2000/kihon1/00/hyodai.htm>
- Mulgan, Aurelia George. 1997. Electoral Determinants of Agrarian Power: Measuring Rural Decline in Japan. *Political Studies* 45 (5):875-899.
- . 2000. *The politics of agriculture in Japan*, Nissan Institute/Routledge Japanese studies series. London: Routledge.
- . 2005. Where Tradition Meets Change: Japan's Agricultural Politics in Transition. *Journal of Japanese Studies* 31 (2):261-298.
- Myerson, Roger B. 1993. Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems. *The American Political Science Review* 87 (4):856-869.
- Narasimhan, C. R. L. 2008. Hope at last over Doha Round of trade talks financial scene *The Hindu*, July 28.
- Negishi, Mayumi. 2008. *Doha Round still snagged on farm trade*. Japan Times Online, 20 December 2005 [cited 25 April 2008]. Available from <http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nb20051220a1.html>
- NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute. *In the GATT negotiations, it was proposed that Japan should eventually open up its rice market by adopting a system of having a high tariff at first and then gradually lowering it. What do you think about opening up the rice market?* 1993 [cited 3 March 2008. Available from http://roperweb.ropercenter.uconn.edu/cgi-bin/hsrun.exe/Roperweb/JPOLL/StateId/Rmd1FuncGAKWuO0FtYBoBXHN1-9H--VHJV/HAHTpage/Summary_Link?RCQU_QSTN_ID=8168
- . *How much of your household income is derived from agriculture...most of it, part of it, or none?* 1996 [cited 3 March 2008. Available from http://roperweb.ropercenter.uconn.edu/cgi-bin/hsrun.exe/Roperweb/JPOLL/StateId/RmdUAuncMnKWuOkltYBgEX8d1-9K--3rJo/HAHTpage/Summary_Link?RCQU_QSTN_ID=15334
- Ohnuki-Tierney, E. 1993. *Rice as Self: Japanese Identities Through Time*: Princeton University Press.
- Ohnuki-Tierney, Emiko. 1995. Structure, Event and Historical Metaphor: Rice and Identities in Japanese History. *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 1 (2):227-253.
- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2006. STAN Bilateral Trade Database Vol 2006 release 01: SourceOECD.
- Page, Benjamin I., Julia Rabinovich, and David G. Tully. 2008. How Americans feel about Asian countries and why. *Journal of East Asian Studies* 8 (1):29-59.

- Pekkanen, Saadia M. 2005. Bilateralism, multilateralism, or regionalism? Japan's trade forum choices. *Journal of East Asian Studies* 5 (1):77-104.
- Putnam, Robert D. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. *International Organization* 42 (3):427-460.
- Rayner, A. J., K. A. Ingersent, and R. C. Hine. 1993. Agriculture in the Uruguay Round: An Assessment. *The Economic Journal* 103 (421):1513-1527.
- Reilly, Benjamin. 2007. Electoral systems and party systems in East Asia. *Journal of East Asian Studies* 7 (2):185-202.
- Revenge, Ana L. 1992. Exporting Jobs?: The Impact of Import Competition on Employment and Wages in U.S. Manufacturing. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 107 (1):255-284.
- . 1997. Employment and Wage Effects of Trade Liberalization: The Case of Mexican Manufacturing. *Journal of Labor Economics* 15 (3):20-43.
- Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade. *The American Political Science Review* 81 (4):1121-1137.
- Rohter, Larry. 2006. Agriculture Discord Stymies World Trade Talks' Revival. *The New York Times*, September 11.
- Sasada, Hironori. 2008. Japan's New Agricultural Trade Policy and Electoral Reform: 'Agricultural Policy in an Offensive Posture [seme no nosei]'. *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 9 (02):121-144.
- Scheve, Kenneth F., and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2001. What determines individual trade-policy preferences? *Journal of International Economics* 54 (2):267-292.
- Seligmann, Albert L. 1997. Japan's New Electoral System: Has Anything Changed? *Asian Survey* 37 (5):409-428.
- Shin Joho Center. *Because of the large trade imbalance between Japan and the West, Europe and the United States are urging Japan to take further actions to open its market. Which of the following is closest to your thinking on this issue?* 1994 [cited 3 March 2008]. Available from http://roperweb.ropercenter.uconn.edu/cgi-bin/hsrun.exe/Roperweb/JPOLL/StateId/RmsmuAnc200WuC5mtYS0qQAr1-9F3-4sLE/HAHTpage/Summary_Link?RCQU_QSTN_ID=11750
- . 2008. *Because of the large trade imbalance between Japan and the West, Europe and the United States are urging Japan to take further actions to open its market. Which of the following is closest to your thinking on this issue?* , 5 October 1997 [cited 13 February 2008]. Available from http://roperweb.ropercenter.uconn.edu/cgi-bin/hsrun.exe/Roperweb/JPOLL/StateId/RiTQvmiCLeiWewAZt1rtKfKaZ0CBo-4aJL/HAHTpage/Summary_Link?RCQU_QSTN_ID=18662
- . 2008. *Many developing countries demand the lowering of tariffs and abolishing import restrictions when they export their products to developed countries. In light of this, which of the following is closest to your view concerning trade between Japan and developing countries?* , 5 October 1997 [cited 13 February 2008]. Available from http://roperweb.ropercenter.uconn.edu/cgi-bin/hsrun.exe/Roperweb/JPOLL/StateId/RiTQvmiCLeiWewAZt1rtKfKaZ0CBo-4aJL/HAHTpage/Summary_Link?RCQU_QSTN_ID=18661
- Silk, Leonard. 2008. *Economic Scene; Failure Looming For Trade Talks*. New York Times, 28 February 1992 [cited 23 April 2008]. Available from <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE0DA173AF93BA15751C0A964958260&sec=&spon=>.

- Snyder, Jack L. 1991. *Myths of empire : domestic politics and international ambition*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
- Stolper, Wolfgang F., and Paul A. Samuelson. 1941. Protection and Real Wages. *The Review of Economic Studies* 9 (1):58-73.
- Tabuchi, Hiroko. 2007. Scandals in food industry shatter safety myth. *The Japan Times*, October 29.
- Tangermann, Stefan. 2004. Farming support: the truth behind the numbers. *OECD Observer* (March), http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/1223/Farming_support:_the_truth.html.
- The Daily Yomiuri. 1992. Tanabu Reappointment Surprises Agriculture Ministry Officials: The Daily Yomiuri.
- Vogel, Steven K. 1999. When Interests Are Not Preferences: The Cautionary Tale of Japanese Consumers. *Comparative Politics* 31 (2):187-207.
- Weisman, Steven R. 2008. *Package of Deals Proposed to Save Global Trade Talks*. New York Times, 18 July 2007 [cited 27 April 2008]. Available from <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/18/business/worldbusiness/18trade.html?scp=16&sq=japan+doha+agriculture&st=nyt>
- Welch, David A. 2005. *Painful choices : a theory of foreign policy change*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- World Trade Organization. 2008. *Singapore Ministerial Declaration* [Wordperfect Document], 18 December 1996 [cited 13 February 2008]. Available from <http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/MIN96/DEC.WPF>.
- . 2008. *Agriculture - Explaining the Agreement - Market Access*. World Trade Organization 2008 [cited August 12 2008]. Available from http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/ag_intro02_access_e.htm.
- WTO Secretariat. 1990. Clarification and Elaboration of Elements of Detailed Proposals Pursuant to the Mid-Term Review Decision. In *Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Uruguay Round: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Uruguay Round*.
- . 1990. Synoptic Table of Negotiating Proposals Submitted Pursuant to Paragraph 11 of the Mid-Term Review Agreement on Agriculture. In *Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Uruguay Round: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Uruguay Round*.
- . 2002. Members' Usage of Domestic Support Categories, Export Subsidies and Export Credits, edited by C. o. Agriculture: World Trade Organization.
- Yomiuri Shimbun. 2006. Yomiuri Shimbun August Opinion Poll: Yomiuri Shimbun.
- . 2008. Yomiuri Shimbun January 2008 Opinion Polls Yomiuri Shimbun.
- Zarocostas, John. 1992. Farm Exporting Nations Blast EC, Japan Tariff Offers: Journal of Commerce.