I'm a PhD Candidate in the Department of Economics at the University of Southern California. I am interested in Applied Microeconomic Theory, especially Matching Theory, and the Economics of Financial Markets. My thesis advisor is Michael J. P. Magill.
ABSTRACT:
Paired kidney exchange programs have been instituted to facilitate kidney donations from live donors;
these donors are medically incompatible with their intended recipients and a paired kidney exchange
program allows incompatible donor-patient pairs swap kidneys. Exchanges involving more than two pairs,
in “cyclic chain” fashion, have allowed several patients receive kidneys in a single circular transaction.
We study cyclic paired kidney exchange frameworks in which the length of the cycle is fixed and, in particular,
is at least 3 pairs long - the problem of Paired Kidney Exchange with Cyclic Preferences (PKECP).
We provide theoretical and algorithmic results for the PKECP problem. We show that stable matchings
exist for a large class of instances of the problem. We also show that the set of strongly stable
matchings has certain special properties - they are the fixed points of a decreasing function on a
lattice - which allows us to compute all of them using a technique developed by
Echenique and Yenmez (2007).
3620 S Vermont Ave KAP 300,
Department of Economics, University of Southern California,
Los Angeles, CA-90089
Email: brijeshp at usc.edu Fax: (213) 740-8543 Tel: (213) 740-3507